The philosophical case for God’s existence

In my Islamic philosophy class, we have been studying al-Ghazali’s kalam cosmological argument. It borrows from the Aristotelian First Cause arguments and the classic “Contingency Argument” presented in Montgomery’s Tractatus, Logico-Theologicus:

“The philosophical case for God’s existence is best made by way of the Contingency argument, which employs the underlying foundational principle of the traditional theistic arguments, namely

Contingent –> Absolute

The argument may be formulated thusly:

1. Nothing in the world can explain itself.

2. The world is the sum total of everything in it.

3. .: The world as a whole is contingent, requiring an explanation beyond itself, i.e., a transcendent God.

4. That transcendent God must either be absolute (non-contingent) or himself require explanation.

5. If contingent, a higher-level Deity will be required to explain him, and so on, ad infinitum, producing an infinite series (where W = the contingent world, and G = God): W –> G –> G^2 –> G^3 … G^n-3 –> G^n-2 –>G^n-1 –>G^n

6. But since an infinite series, by definition, has no end, there will be no explanation for any Deity prior to G^n, and the world itself will remain without explanation of the contingent world.

7. .: An absolute, non-contingent, existent God must be regarded as the final explanation of the contingent world.

But why do we need to bother with an “explanation” for the world? Why not just be satisfied with the world as it is? To take this route is, in effect, to deny the contingent nature of the world and mythologically make it absolute–in the face of all empirical knowledge of its non-self-explanatory character.”

~ by Barron on June 9, 2006.